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INTRODUCTION
It is now commonplace for judicial politics scholars to describe the
federal judicial hierarchy in terms of a principal–agent relationship.1 The
basic outlines of this model are familiar: the United States Supreme Court is


Charles Nagel Professor, Washington University School of Law, St. Louis. My thanks to Jarrod
Reece and William Osberghaus who provided excellent research assistance. For helpful comments and
feedback, thanks to Scott Baker, Matthew Hall, and David Law, as well as participants at the Political
Science and Law Conference hosted by Northwestern University School of Law and the Searle Center
on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth at Northwestern University School of Law and participants
at workshops at Washington University School of Law and St. Louis University School of Law.
1
See, e.g., Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower Court
Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POL. 534, 536 (2002); Charles M. Cameron,
Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model
of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 103 (2000); Tom S. Clark, A
Principal-Agent Theory of En Banc Review, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 76 (2008); Tracey E. George &
Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 171, 175 (2001); Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Federal Court System: A
Principal-Agent Perspective, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 819, 820–22 (2003); Susan B. Haire, Stefanie A.
Lindquist & Donald R. Songer, Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical
Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 143, 162–64 (2003); Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political Control, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 326, 329 (2007); Stefanie A. Lindquist, Susan B.
Haire & Donald R. Songer, Supreme Court Auditing of the US Courts of Appeals: An Organizational
Perspective, 17 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 607, 610 (2007); Kirk A. Randazzo, Strategic Anticipation and the Hierarchy of Justice in U.S. District Courts, 36 AM. POL. RES. 669, 671–75 (2008); Donald
R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent
Model of Supreme Court–Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994); Matt Spitzer &
Eric Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649, 670 (2000).
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conceptualized as the “principal” and the lower federal courts as the
“agents.” Given resource constraints, the Supreme Court necessarily delegates some of the work of deciding cases to other courts, but as the principal, it sets the policy that the lower courts should implement.2 Lower court
judges, however, have their own goals and preferences, which raises the
risk that they will pursue their own ends,3 thus creating the classic dilemma
of principal–agent relationships: how to ensure that agents act on the principal’s behalf and not in their own self-interest.
Like traditional attitudinal models, which hold that judges’ preferences
determine their voting behavior, principal–agent models assume that judges
have policy goals that they seek to effectuate through their decisionmaking.4
Most commonly, these policy goals are framed in terms of outcomes. For
example, conservative judges are assumed to prefer outcomes favoring the
government in criminal cases, and liberal judges are assumed to prefer outcomes favoring civil rights plaintiffs. Although principal–agent theories
recognize that institutional context affects judges’ decisionmaking, many of
these theories simply ignore the role of law. To the extent that they do account for law, they tend to understand it in instrumental terms—as a means
of mediating the inevitable conflict between upper and lower courts over
policy outcomes. Assuming that policy outcomes are the goal of judges’
decisionmaking, scholars have thus characterized the law as merely a means

2

See, e.g., George & Yoon, supra note 1, at 822 (explaining that the Supreme Court delegates a
great deal of its work to lower courts, which must effectuate the Court’s doctrines); Randazzo, supra
note 1, at 671 (discussing how the principal, lacking resources, delegates tasks to the agent, who is expected to represent the principal’s interests); Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 675 (describing
the Supreme Court as the principal and the courts of appeals as agents who should follow the Court’s
policy dictates).
3
See, e.g., Benesh & Reddick, supra note 1, at 536 (positing that lower courts will not follow Supreme Court policy when they disagree with it); Cameron, Segal & Songer, supra note 1, at 104 (assuming that upper and lower courts have different preferences regarding case dispositions); George & Yoon,
supra note 1, at 822 (noting that when the preferences of Supreme Court and lower court judges diverge,
there is “an incentive to make a non-complying ruling”); Lindquist, Haire & Songer, supra note 1, at
610 (describing how goal conflicts that arise when upper and lower courts have divergent preferences
reduce the ability of the Supreme Court to guide the decisions of the lower courts); McNollgast, Politics
and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631,
1633–36 (1995) (pointing out that the Supreme Court and lower courts often differ significantly in their
preferences regarding judicial doctrine, creating a risk of noncompliance with Supreme Court
precedent); Randazzo, supra note 1, at 671 (noting that the agent’s preferences may differ from the principal’s, creating tension in the relationship); Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 675 (observing
that “utility maximizing appeals court judges also have their own policy preferences, which they may
seek to follow to the extent possible”).
4
See, e.g., George & Solimine, supra note 1, at 175 (theorizing that Justices seek to advance their
policy preferences through the certiorari process); Haire, Lindquist & Songer, supra note 1, at 163 (suggesting that “federal judges at all levels are guided by their policy preferences”); McNollgast, supra note
3, at 1636 (assuming that judges “act rationally to bring policy as close as possible to their own preferred outcome”); Spitzer & Talley, supra note 1, at 655 (modeling judges as primarily interested in
reaching legal outcomes which are as consistent as possible with their policy preferences).
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for upper courts to communicate their policy preferences5 or as an instrument for exercising control over lower courts.6
The assumption that the lower federal courts are agents of the Supreme
Court has become so widely accepted that the applicability of the model to
the federal judicial hierarchy is rarely questioned. A few have raised
doubts—for example, Judge Richard Posner notes that if federal appellate
judges are agents, the identity of their principals is “a matter of some uncertainty.”7 Similarly, others have suggested that federal judges could appropriately be viewed as the agents of their appointing President, Congress, or
the public.8 Nevertheless, many judicial politics scholars readily accept the
characterization of the lower federal courts as agents of the Supreme Court.
Because the federal judiciary is organized as a hierarchy, with some resemblance to other organizational forms that utilize monitoring and incentives
to achieve the principal’s goals, the principal–agent model is assumed to be
an apt one.
Upon closer examination, however, the principal–agent model does not
map so neatly onto the structure of the judicial hierarchy. For example, the
Supreme Court, to a far greater degree than most principals, is highly constrained in its ability to shape the incentives of district and circuit court
judges. Moreover, there is no direct contractual relationship between Supreme Court Justices and lower federal court judges, making uncertain the
basis for any duty on the part of lower courts to act in the interests of the
Supreme Court. The lack of an exact fit should not be a surprise given that
5

See, e.g., Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew Stephenson, Informative Precedent and Intrajudicial Communication, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 755, 757 (2002) (suggesting that policy-oriented appellate
courts develop lines of cases in order to communicate better with lower courts); Haire, Lindquist &
Songer, supra note 1, at 143–44 (asserting that appellate courts’ power to affirm or reverse is a means of
signaling their preferences to the lower courts); see also, e.g., McNollgast, supra note 3, at 1639 (describing a “doctrinal interval” that indicates a range of rules “that are acceptable to the Supreme Court
when reviewing decisions by a lower court”).
6
See George & Yoon, supra note 1, at 823–24; Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1, at 326.
7
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 12, 126 (2008).
8
See, e.g., CHRISTINE L. NEMACHECK, STRATEGIC SELECTION: PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES FROM HERBERT HOOVER THROUGH GEORGE W. BUSH 33–34 (2007) (likening the relationship between a president and his Supreme Court nominee to that of a principal and an
agent); POSNER, supra note 7, at 126 (asking whether a federal judge’s principal is a higher court, Congress, the appointing President, the current President, the American people, the framers of the Constitution, the Constitution itself and statutes and precedents, or “the law”); James C. Brent, An Agent and
Two Principals: U.S. Court of Appeals Responses to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 27 AM. POL. Q. 236, 255 (1999) (finding
that, in passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, “Congress [was] as successful as the Supreme
Court in enlisting the Court of Appeals as its agent”); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Which Judges
Write Their Opinions (and Should We Care)?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1077, 1082 (2005) (describing
judges as agents of the public); Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 435
(2007) (observing that lower court judges could be conceptualized as agents of the President who appointed them or of the Congress that confirmed them and enacted the laws that they interpret); Spitzer &
Talley, supra note 1, at 650 (noting that the Judicial Branch could be viewed as delegated decisionmaker
for the Legislative and Executive Branches).
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the concept of agency was developed by the common law to regulate representative relationships and later applied by economists and political scientists to describe institutions such as the private firm or the government
agency—all contexts quite different from the judicial hierarchy. The lack
of an exact fit alone does not mean the model cannot be useful, as existing
theoretical constructs may offer useful insights when applied in new contexts. Models necessarily simplify a complex reality, however, and in
doing so, they highlight certain features of the phenomenon under study
while eliding others.
The purpose of this Article is to critically examine the use of principal–
agent models to describe the federal judicial hierarchy. It explores how reliance on principal–agent theories shapes our understanding of how federal
judges make decisions and interact with other actors in the judicial system.
As I argue below, agency models are useful in highlighting certain aspects
of the interaction between upper and lower courts—specifically, the existence of value conflicts and informational asymmetries. In other ways,
however, traditional principal–agent models are a poor fit for the relationship between the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court. As a consequence, reliance on these models may limit our understanding of intercourt
interactions. More specifically, these models tend to obscure important
normative questions about the relationship between lower and upper courts,
as well as to distort the role that law plays in judicial decisionmaking.
Moving beyond principal–agent theories expands the possibilities for
modeling and understanding the federal judicial hierarchy. Instead of being
viewed as merely a signal or command to lower courts, the law should be
understood as the joint product of the Supreme Court and the lower courts.
Producing a coherent body of law requires cooperation and coordination between the various levels of the judicial hierarchy at the same time that the
law is the ground on which value conflicts between judges are played out.
Thus, the interaction between the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
might be more productively modeled as a type of mixed-motive coordination game rather than a traditional principal–agent relationship.
I. THE JUDICIAL HIERARCHY
The basic outline of the federal judicial system is familiar. Federal
courts are arranged hierarchically, with district courts hearing and disposing
of cases in the first instance, subject to review by one of the twelve circuit
courts of appeals and ultimately by the Supreme Court. While district
judges generally hear and decide cases alone, the appellate courts are collegial courts. Courts of appeals typically hear cases in panels of three
judges, and the nine Justices of the Supreme Court decide cases together.
Although the interactions among judges on a collegial court are a critical
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aspect of the decisionmaking process,9 for purposes of this Article, I treat
these appellate panels as unitary actors vis à vis the other courts in the hierarchy.
In light of this hierarchical structure, judicial politics scholars have
used principal–agent theories to describe the interaction between the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.10 Donald Songer, Jeffrey Segal,
and Charles Cameron describe the Supreme Court in terms of a “principal,
whose subordinates, the courts of appeals, are the agents” and conclude that
“the circumstances [of the judicial hierarchy] fit the model well.”11 Similarly, Tracey George and Albert Yoon write that “[s]ince the Supreme Court is
formally at the apex of the judicial pyramid, the Court’s decisions can be
conceptualized as a principal directing (or attempting to direct) its agents,
the lower courts.”12 Others argue that the “institutional dynamics associated
with appellate review in the federal judicial hierarchy are captured by principal-agent theory”13 and that “principal–agent theory is a useful device for

9

A number of empirical studies have demonstrated that federal appellate court judges’ voting patterns appear to be influenced not only by the judges’ own policy preferences but also by the other judges
with whom they sit when deciding a case. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M.
ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 11–12 (2006) (finding that “variations in panel composition lead to dramatically different
outcomes” in a number of issue areas); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26 (2008) (finding evidence of panel effects in cases under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2156 (1998) (concluding that the presence of ideological minorities on judicial panels influences the votes of majority
judges); Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1374 (2009) (empirically confirming that
panel composition affects decisionmaking on circuit courts of appeals and testing competing explanations for panel effects); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit,
83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1771–72 (1997) (concluding that the ideology of the other panel members influences a judge’s vote in environmental cases); Joshua B. Fischman, Interpreting Circuit Court Voting
Patterns: A ‘Social Interactions’ Framework 20 (Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No.
2010-27, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1636002 (finding evidence of panel effects
in multiple datasets of circuit judge votes in a variety of issue areas). In addition, a rich academic literature has considered how interactions among judges on multimember courts, such as the United States
Supreme Court or the federal courts of appeals, affect their decisionmaking. E.g., FORREST MALTZMAN,
JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL
GAME (2000); Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97
MICH. L. REV. 2297 (1999); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many:
Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1993); Jeffrey R. Lax, Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy: Discretion, Reputation and the Rule of Four, 15 J. THEORETICAL POL.
61 (2003); Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the US Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276 (2007).
10
See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
11
Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 675.
12
George & Yoon, supra note 1, at 819.
13
Haire, Lindquist & Songer, supra note 1, at 146.
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examining the impact of Supreme Court decisions on lower court behavior.”14
Scholars invoked principal–agent theories in order to better understand
the relationship between upper and lower courts and to explore how the hierarchical structure of the judiciary influences decisionmaking. In many
ways, these inquiries represent a real advance. Traditional attitudinal models of judicial decisionmaking emphasized the centrality of judicial attitudes, generally understood as policy preferences, in determining judicial
voting behavior.15 This approach focused on the individual judge and often
assumed that case outcomes reflect the sincere policy preferences of the
judge or judges voting in the case. Principal–agent theories draw attention
to the fact that judges do not decide in isolation but are part of a larger institutional structure and that their interactions with other actors in that system
also influence their decisionmaking. Thus, principal–agent theories have
led scholars to explore questions such as the extent to which circuit courts
obey the dictates of the Supreme Court,16 how the Supreme Court selects
which cases to review,17 and how the Supreme Court uses doctrine to control outcomes in the lower courts.18 Principal–agent theories are certainly
useful in framing these types of inquiries. However, the use of any heuristic necessarily draws attention to certain features of a situation while ignoring others. In the Parts that follow, I explore the ways in which the
assumptions of agency theory have shaped and limited our understanding of
the judicial hierarchy.
As a caveat, my focus here is on the vertical relationships within the
federal judiciary, specifically between the United States Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts. Principal–agent theories have been applied to other interactions in the judicial system as well: for example, the relationships
between the United States Supreme Court and state supreme courts,19 be14

Randazzo, supra note 1, at 672.
See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL 65 (1993) (explaining that the attitudinal model “holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes
in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices”); Frank B.
Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance,
92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 265 (1997) (“[The attitudinal model] suggests that judicial decisionmaking is
not based upon reasoned judgment from precedent, but rather upon each judge’s political ideology and
the identity of the parties.”).
16
See Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1.
17
See Cameron, Segal & Songer, supra note 1.
18
See Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1.
19
See, e.g., Sara C. Benesh & Wendy L. Martinek, State Supreme Court Decision Making in Confession Cases, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 109, 125 (2002); Keith Rollin Eakins & Karen Swenson, An Analysis of
the States’ Responses to Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 371, 373–74 (2007);
Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457, 1476 (2005). But cf. John
C. Kilwein & Richard A. Brisbin, Jr., Policy Convergence in a Federal Judicial System: The Application
of Intensified Scrutiny Doctrines by State Supreme Courts, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 122, 124–25 (1997)
(questioning the application of a principal–agent model to relationships between the United States Supreme Court and the state supreme courts).
15
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tween a circuit sitting en banc and a three-judge panel,20 and between the
federal courts of appeals and district courts.21 These theories may or may
not be apt when applied to those settings, and I do not attempt to address
them here. The more general point is that a close examination of the particular circumstances is important in determining when it is useful to draw an
analogy to the agency relationship in any context.
II. PRINCIPAL–AGENT RELATIONSHIPS
By applying principal–agent theories to the federal judicial hierarchy,
scholars draw on an extensive literature about a particular type of relationship. In this Part, I review three classic conceptions of the agency relationship—from common law, economics, and political science. These
conceptions differ in important ways from one another and are deployed for
different purposes, yet all share certain core elements that give the theory its
power. The scholars who characterize the judicial hierarchy in principal–
agent terms are not arguing that it matches these earlier conceptions in all
their particulars. Nevertheless, examining the canonical cases, their basic
structure, and the insights they generate helps illuminate the ways in which
principal–agent theories may enhance or impede understanding of the federal judicial hierarchy.
A. Common Law Agency
Concepts of agency are rooted in the common law and intended to address situations in which one person can be legally bound by the actions of
another.22 Although the law recognizes a number of situations in which one
person can act on behalf of another, an agency relationship is a particular
type of representative relationship with defined legal consequences. According to the Third Restatement of Agency,
Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a “principal”)
manifests assent to another person (an “agent”) that the agent shall act on the
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.23

20

See Clark, supra note 1, at 76; Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 245 (1999); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald
Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981–1990, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1008, 1011–13 (1991); Michael E. Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REV. 29, 49 (1988).
21
See Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into the “Affirmance Effect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 373 (2005); Haire,
Lindquist & Songer, supra note 1, at 144–50; Randazzo, supra note 1, at 673–75.
22
See Mark McGaw, Agency: English Common Law, in 1 OXFORD INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY 108, 108–10 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 2009).
23
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
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Several elements are necessary to establish a legally recognized agency
relationship. First, the relationship is based on contract or consent.24 Mutual agreement is necessary not only to establish the existence of the relationship but also to determine the scope of the agency—that is, the areas in
which the agent is empowered to act on behalf of the principal.25 The
second element is the power of the agent.26 The agency relationship creates
authority in the agent to act for the principal—not only to pursue the principal’s interests but to do so in ways that may bind the principal or affect its
legal relations with third parties.27 Third, the principal retains the right to
control the actions of the agent. This right of control entails the right “to
assess the agent’s performance, provide instructions to the agent, and terminate the agency relationship by revoking the agent’s authority.”28 Consent and control are essential elements. In the absence of consent, express
or implied, or a right of control and termination, the common law generally
does not recognize an agency relationship.29
Much of traditional agency law is concerned with legal relationships
with third parties, focusing on questions such as when and under what circumstances the actions of an agent will create binding obligations or give
rise to liability on the part of the principal.30 More importantly for the discussion here, agency law also addresses the obligations of the agent to the
principal. Specifically, the law imposes on the agent a fiduciary duty to act
not only on behalf of the principal but also in the interest of the principal.31
This duty requires the agent not merely to follow instructions but also to act
loyally, subordinating her own interests to that of the principal. As explained in the Restatement,
An agent’s fiduciary position requires the agent to interpret the principal’s
statement of authority, as well as any interim instructions received from the
principal, in a reasonable manner to further purposes of the principal that the
24

See id. cmt. d (“Under the common-law definition, agency is a consensual relationship. The definition requires that an agent-to-be and a principal-to-be consent to their association with each other.”);
Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract Theory, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1969,
1981 (1987) (describing a consent theory of agency); Gerard McMeel, Philosophical Foundations of the
Law of Agency, 116 L.Q. REV. 387, 388–92 (2000) (providing a history and description of the consensual theory of agency doctrine).
25
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e.
26
See id. cmt. c.
27
See id.
28
Id. cmt. f(1).
29
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY intro. (“In general, agency does not encompass situations
in which an ‘agent’ is not subject to a right of control in the person who benefits from or whose interests
are affected by the agent’s acts, who lacks the power to terminate the ‘agent’s’ representation, or who
has not consented to the representation.”).
30
See id. §§ 6.01–6.11, 7.03–7.08; see also Eric Rasmusen, Agency Law and Contract Formation,
6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 369, 370 (2004) (explaining that traditional agency law is often concerned with
what happens when the agent’s effort is mischanneled, causing harm to a third party).
31
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e.
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agent knows or should know, in light of facts that the agent knows or should
know at the time of acting.32

Although in theory the agent is under the control of the principal, as a
practical matter that control will always be incomplete. It is impossible for
the principal to give advance instructions precise enough to avoid giving the
agent some discretion. That inability to specify comprehensive directions
and the agent’s authority to act in the absence of the principal mean that the
agent will inevitably have opportunities for personal gain as a result of the
agency. The law responds to this risk by imposing a duty of loyalty. Thus,
“[a]n agent . . . is not free to exploit gaps or arguable ambiguities in the
principal’s instructions to further the agent’s self-interest, or the interest of
another, when the agent’s interpretation does not serve the principal’s purposes or interests known to the agent.”33
The agent’s duty of loyalty has been explained in different ways.
Some courts and commentators emphasize a moral basis for the duty, citing
the vulnerability of the principal as the reason for imposing a higher standard of conduct on the agent.34 This vulnerability is inherent in the relationship because the agent has the power to affect the principal’s legal rights
and obligations; in many cases, this vulnerability is exacerbated by the
agent’s superior knowledge, skill, and access to information. On this view,
the agent’s fiduciary duties are imposed by law based on the character of
the relationship.
Others have explained fiduciary duties as a means of simplifying the
contracting process.35 As Judge Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel
write, “[T]he duty of loyalty is a response to the impossibility of writing
contracts completely specifying the parties’ obligations.”36 Principals typically hire an agent because they cannot perform the work—perhaps due to
limited time or lack of expertise—but the conditions making the agency desirable also make it difficult for the principal to direct or to evaluate the
32

Id.
Id.
34
See Compagnie de Reassurance d’Ile de France v. New England Reinsurance Corp., 944 F. Supp.
986, 996 (D. Mass. 1996) (noting that “fiduciary dut[ies] arise out of a relationship of vulnerability”);
Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 776–
77 (2000) (arguing that the rationale for the duty of loyalty is a gross imbalance of power between the
parties); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J.
879, 902 (suggesting that fiduciary obligations are often justified because of one party’s vulnerability to
the fiduciary’s abuse of power).
35
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e (“In the absence of the fiduciary benchmark, the principal would have a greater need to define authority and give interim instructions in more
elaborate and specific form to anticipate and eliminate contingencies that an agent might otherwise exploit in a self-interested fashion.”); id. § 8.01 cmt. b (“The fiduciary principle supplements manifestations that a principal makes to an agent, making it unnecessary for the principal to graft explicit
qualifications and prohibitions onto the principal’s statements of authorization to the agent.”).
36
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425,
426 (1993).
33
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agent’s efforts. In such a situation, rather than attempting to provide detailed directions, the principal delegates authority to the agent to achieve an
objective, subject to the duty of loyalty. The duty thus “replaces detailed
contractual terms,” and the obligations it imposes should mimic the terms
that “the parties themselves would have preferred if bargaining were cheap
and all promises fully enforced.”37
Common law agency doctrine thus offers one solution to the difficulty
of aligning the interests of the agent with the principal: imposing an enforceable duty of loyalty on the agent. Whether this duty is justified as morally required or as efficient contractual gap-filling, it arises because of the
existence of a relationship to which the parties have assented and, to that
extent, is consensual in origin. The fact that the relationship is established
by agreement also creates the possibility that the agency might be structured
in a way that mitigates potential conflicts. Thus, as discussed in the next
section, economic theories have focused on the question whether or how
contractual agreements can be used to better align the interests of the agent
with that of the principal.
B. The Economic Model
Economists have utilized principal–agent models to analyze a wide
variety of private economic relationships, such as that between employer
and employee,38 shareholder and manager,39 and landowner and tenant farmer.40 These models are related to but distinct from the legal concept of the
principal–agent relationship. Like the law of agency, economic theory is
concerned with issues of monitoring and control within a consensual relationship. Rather than designing legal rules to address the problem, however, economic theories ask how contractual incentives can be structured in
order to induce the agent to act in the principal’s interest.41 In doing so,

37

Id. at 427; see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 92 (1991) (“Socially optimal fiduciary rules approximate the bargain that investors
and managers would have reached if they could have bargained (and enforced their agreements) at no
cost.”).
38
See, e.g., Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Some Results on Incentive Contracts with Applications to
Education and Employment, Health Insurance, and Law Enforcement, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 20, 20
(1978) (listing the employer–employee relationship as one that fits the “agency paradigm”); Terry M.
Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 756 (1984) (same); David E.M.
Sappington, Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1991, at 45, 46
(same).
39
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976); Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and
Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55, 66 (1979).
40
See Sappington, supra note 38, at 45, 46–49.
41
See Rasmusen, supra note 30, at 370 (“For the economist, the agency problem is how to give the
agent incentives for the right action; for the lawyer, it is how to ‘mop up’ the damage once the agent has
taken the wrong action.”).
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they first identify more formally the structure of the contracting problem in
various settings.
The economic models share with the legal concept several core assumptions. The principal–agent relationship is conceived as a contractual
one, in which the principal’s payoff is affected by the agent’s actions and in
which the principal delegates decisionmaking authority to the agent.42 The
agent is hired to achieve the principal’s purposes and, by her actions, is able
to affect the principal’s interests. In economic theories, however, the focus
is not limited to actions that create legal obligations on the principal but is
instead generalized to any situation in which the agent’s activities determine, at least in part, the outcome for the principal.43 Thus, the diligence of
the employee will increase the productivity of the firm, the decisions of a
manager will affect the return for shareholders, and the level of effort invested by a tenant farmer will influence the crop yield for the landowner.
In each of these cases, other factors—technological constraints, market
conditions, levels of rainfall—will influence the outcome, but the agent’s
activities will have an impact as well.
Although the principal enters into the relationship in order to achieve
certain purposes, the agent has her own private goals, which may conflict
with those of the principal, and thus the problem for the principal is to determine how best to motivate the agent to perform according to the principal’s wishes.44 If the principal had complete information or if monitoring
costs were zero, this problem would be trivial because the principal could
effectively observe and punish any deviations. However, because of the existence of private information, two types of problems arise: adverse selection and moral hazard.
The problem of adverse selection affects the contracting process because applicants have hidden information about their true “type”—that is,
42

See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 39, at 308 (defining an agency relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent”); Moe,
supra note 38, at 756 (“The principal-agent model is an analytic expression of the agency relationship,
in which one party, the principal, considers entering into a contractual agreement with another, the
agent, in the expectation that the agent will subsequently choose actions that produce outcomes desired
by the principal.”).
43
See Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
203, 205 (2005) (identifying as one of the “core assumptions” of principal–agent models that the agent’s
action determines in part the payoff to the principal); Shavell, supra note 39, at 55 (describing the principal–agent relationship as one in which the agent’s effort, together with a random element, determines
the outcome for the principal).
44
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 39, at 308 (discussing how the principal can limit divergences
from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent); Moe, supra note 38, at 756 (asserting that the essence of the principal’s problem is to design an incentive structure that makes pursuing
the principal’s objectives advantageous for the agent); Sappington, supra note 38, at 45 (“The central
concern is how the principal can best motivate the agent to perform as the principal would prefer, taking
into account the difficulties in monitoring the agent’s activities.”); Shavell, supra note 39, at 55 (considering optimal fee arrangements to create appropriate incentives for an agent).
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their skills, values, and objectives.45 The principal knows the type with
which it desires to contract but cannot reliably detect the relevant information. For example, an employer may wish to hire someone who has a specialized skill and is highly motivated for a position involving substantial
discretion and independent judgment. It cannot know for certain whether
any particular applicant has the desired qualities and must rely on proxies
such as education and experience to make its hiring decisions. Applicants
who lack these qualities will have incentives to misrepresent their abilities,
while highly qualified individuals may find it difficult to communicate
credibly their true abilities and to distinguish themselves from less qualified
applicants.46 To address this problem, the principal may attempt to structure
the contract in a manner that screens for high-quality agents.
Informational asymmetries plague the agency relationship after it has
been formed as well. The principal cannot directly observe the agent’s activities, thereby creating a risk of moral hazard.47 Without accurate information about the agent’s efforts, the principal must rely on proxy measures,
which are necessarily imperfect.48 As a result, the agent may be tempted to
shirk—that is, to pursue her own ends (e.g., taking fewer precautions or expending less effort)—rather than maximize the principal’s welfare. The
principal might rely on any of a number of mechanisms to discourage shirking, such as monitoring agent activity, requiring a bond on the part of the
agent, implementing direct controls, or inducing the agent to share information. Each of these efforts, however, entails costs, and none can completely
eliminate the slippage between the agent’s and the principal’s interests.
Agency costs can thus be understood as the sum of the costs of agent shirking (residual loss) and the costs of efforts to control shirking (monitoring
costs and bonding costs).49 The principal faces a basic optimization problem—how to structure the contract with the agent in a way that minimizes
total agency costs.
One common method for more closely aligning the agent’s interests
with the principal’s is to compensate the agent based on outcome, which is
observable, rather than effort, which is not.50 However, if the agent is risk

45

See Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
57, 61 (1989); Moe, supra note 38, at 754–55. The problem of hidden information also arises after the
agency relationship has been formed because the agent will likely have more information than the principal about exogenous conditions that affect output. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 35 n.63 (1988).
46
See Moe, supra note 38, at 754–55.
47
See Eisenhardt, supra note 45, at 61; Moe, supra note 38, at 755.
48
Moe, supra note 38, at 755.
49
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 37, at 10; Jenson & Meckling, supra note 39, at 308.
50
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 37, at 9 (noting that an alternative to monitoring is to
give employees the right to share in the firm’s profits); TIROLE, supra note 45, at 36 (explaining that if
the agent’s compensation depends on the outcome, the agent will have an incentive to pick the optimal
action); see also Sappington, supra note 38, at 47 (explaining that the principal can motivate the agent
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averse, as is commonly assumed in these models,51 she will require additional compensation to bear the risk.52 If the principal agrees to share the
risk in order to induce her to accept the agency, the full costs of shirking
will no longer be borne by the agent and the problem of moral hazard reappears.53 Thus, “[E]fficiency in incentives must be traded off against efficiency in risk-bearing . . . .”54 Even though agency costs cannot be
eliminated entirely, “the principal’s optimal incentive structure for the agent
is one in which the latter receives some share of the residual in payment for
his efforts, thus giving him a direct stake in the outcome.”55
In the above analysis, the concept of the “residual” is central in shaping
incentives for the agent. It is the prospect of an economic surplus—one that
can be allocated between the principal and the agent—that offers the possibility of reducing the gap between the agent’s private incentives and the
principal’s goals, thereby mitigating the problem of moral hazard. In the
context of private contracting, it is a reasonable assumption that the goal of
the principal is to maximize profit. Thus, the employer wants to maximize
the productive output of the firm, the shareholders seek to maximize the
value of the firm, and the landowner aims to maximize the crop yield. In
each of these settings, the nature of the residual is easily conceptualized.
As will be discussed below, however, applying the notion of a residual in
the context of a public hierarchy like the court system is neither obvious nor
straightforward.
In sum, the economics literature focuses on the optimal contractual arrangements for minimizing agency costs.56 This literature highlights the
problems that result from informational asymmetries and emphasizes that
any mechanisms intended to address these problems necessarily entail other
costs. Designing optimal institutional structures therefore requires balancing residual losses against the costs of implementing more stringent instruments to monitor and control the agent. Although contractual incentives
and institutional structures can be used to mitigate conflicts of interest, the
slippage between the agent’s and the principal’s interests cannot be eliminated entirely.
“by making the agent the residual claimant in the relationship”); Shavell, supra note 39, at 59 (positing
that for a risk-neutral agent the optimal fee schedule pays the agent the outcome minus a constant).
51
See Eisenhardt, supra note 45, at 60–61 (explaining that agents are assumed to be more risk
averse because they cannot diversify their employment).
52
See Sappington, supra note 38, at 49.
53
See id. at 49–50 (noting that when the agent is effectively insured against bad outcomes, he will
exert less effort); Shavell, supra note 39, at 56.
54
Miller, supra note 43, at 206.
55
Moe, supra note 38, at 763.
56
See Sappington, supra note 38, at 45 (listing “design of individualized contracts” as one of the
“major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives”); Shavell, supra note 39 (studying
optimal arrangements for payment in agency relationships). But see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 39,
at 305–06 (using agency theory to explain the ownership structure of firms in a positive rather than normative project).
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C. The Political Model
Over the past several decades, political scientists have drawn on economic models of agency to describe the relationship between administrative
agencies and their political superiors. Earlier work on this bureaucracy emphasized the agencies’ apparent independence, noting that Congress paid
little attention to their activities and invested few resources in monitoring
them.57 Oversight hearings were haphazard, infrequent, and often superficial.58 Even when they did occur, members of Congress typically lacked the
technical expertise and detailed understanding of an agency’s operations to
effectively evaluate its activities.59 These observations led scholars to assume that congressional oversight was ineffectual and to bemoan the lack of
accountability of the large federal bureaucracy.60
Drawing on insights from principal–agent theory, Barry Weingast and
others offered an alternative account of the relationship between Congress
and the administrative bureaucracy. They argued that members of Congress
“possess sufficient rewards and sanctions to create an incentive system for
agencies”61 and identified several levers of control: authority over appropriations, the threat of ex post sanctioning through the use of oversight hearings, new legislation restricting agency activities, and congressional
influence over the appointment and reappointment of agency officials.62 To
the extent that this incentive system works well, they asserted that “few ac-

57

See LAWRENCE C. DODD & RICHARD L. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
170–73 (1979) (asserting that “congressional attention to bureaucratic agencies is haphazard” and that
“the committees most responsible for oversight . . . fail to devote the bulk of their hearings to investigations of agencies”); MORRIS S. OGUL, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE BUREAUCRACY: STUDIES IN
LEGISLATIVE SUPERVISION 182, 186 (1976) (finding that members of Congress see oversight as less
central than other work, and noting that legislative oversight is neither comprehensive nor systematic);
James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 388 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (arguing that neither the White House nor Congress closely scrutinizes agencies).
58
See OGUL, supra note 57, at 193 (summarizing criticisms that legislative oversight “has been sporadic, atomized, erratic, trivial, ineffective, or some combination of these”).
59
See DODD & SCHOTT, supra note 57, at 2 (explaining that “agencies are staffed by specialists . . . [whose] expertise . . . [and] technical facilities for data collection and analysis . . . allow[] them
to bring to policy struggles an authority and knowledge that is difficult for members of Congress, presidents, or political appointees to match”).
60
See id. (describing the administrative state as a “prodigal child . . . [whose] muscle and
brawn . . . challeng[e] [Congress and the President] for hegemony in the national political system”); id.
at 248 (predicting that “[s]o long as Congress attempts to conduct oversight through the current committee and subcommittee system, . . . congressional committees will probably preoccupy themselves with
intra-congressional struggles that leave the bureaucracy broad latitude”); OGUL, supra note 57, at 185
(concluding that congressional influence over agencies is “scattered and slight”); Wilson, supra note 57,
at 391 (arguing that administrative agencies “operate with substantial autonomy, at least with respect to
congressional or executive direction”).
61
Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 768 (1983).
62
Id. at 769–70; Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal Agent
Perspective (with Applications to the SEC), 44 PUB. CHOICE 147, 155–57 (1984).

548

105:535 (2011)

Beyond Principal–Agent Theories

tual punishments need take place for the threat to be effective,”63 and thus
low levels of active congressional oversight are consistent with a situation
in which congressional preferences effectively control agency behavior.64
Moreover, direct monitoring is not necessary because affected constituents
will monitor and report problems, thereby sounding a “fire alarm” to alert
Congress to noncompliant agency actions.65 These theories drew clear lessons from economic models of agency:
[T]he issue of congressional control of the bureaucracy has many of the same
issues present in the debate over separation of ownership and control: little ostensible interest on the part of shareholders is consistent with . . . a strong set
of incentive mechanisms that obviate the need for direct shareholder monitoring.66

Although recognizing that agency costs cannot be eliminated entirely,
they argue that institutional forms evolve to mitigate these problems and
will persist so long as the benefits of the agency arrangements outweigh any
costs.67
Subsequent work in this area shifted attention from monitoring and incentives to structural and procedural constraints. Concerned that “a system
of rewards and punishments is unlikely to be a completely effective solution

63

Weingast & Moran, supra note 61, at 767 n.2.
Id. at 767, 793; see also Weingast, supra note 62, at 148 (arguing that Congress has developed an
effective system for controlling agencies that involves little direct monitoring). Another elaboration of
the basic principal–agent model involves recognition that administrative agencies may be subject to the
control of multiple principals. Congress is neither a unitary actor nor the lone actor, and thus a number
of scholars have incorporated distinct legislative actors—relevant House and Senate committees, House
floor, Senate floor—and a chief executive officer into “multiple principal” models. These extensions
have led some to argue that competition among principals may create greater room for bureaucratic discretion. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of “Congressional Dominance,”
12 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 475, 482 (1987) (”[P]rincipals compete for influence over the agency—which, as a
result . . . [is] attracted to strategies that play its principals off against one another.”). Others have found
that the degree of control over the bureaucracy depends on the circumstances and that even with multiple principals bureaucratic agencies may implement policies that reflect the preferences of elected officials. See, e.g., Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins & Barry R. Weingast, A Theory of Political
Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588, 589, 604–05 (1989) (modeling interactions between the executive and legislature and bureaucratic agents and concluding that under favorable conditions, bureaucrats will follow the policies of elected officials); Thomas H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott,
Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints,
and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
119, 163 (1996) (arguing that the interactions between the President and Congress can create more or
less autonomy for agencies).
65
See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 171–76 (1984) (arguing that “direct, centralized
surveillance” of agencies analogous to police patrols will be less effective in furthering Congress’s policy goals than will “comparatively decentralized and incentive based” models of oversight analogous to
fire alarms).
66
Weingast & Moran, supra note 61, at 767 n.2.
67
See Weingast, supra note 62, at 153–54.
64
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to the control problem,”68 Mathew McCubbins and others argued that Congress seeks to control bureaucracies prospectively by creating structural arrangements that constrain an agency’s substantive discretion.69 For
example, Congress prescribes the regulatory scope of an agency and the legal tools or instruments the agency may use to achieve its goals.70 Similarly, Congress may impose procedural requirements designed to reflect the
competing political interests at the time the legislation was passed71 or to
“stack the deck” to benefit a favored constituency.72 In other words, when
establishing a regulatory agency, Congress chooses administrative structures and procedural requirements in an attempt to ensure that the agency’s
policy outputs will be consistent with Congress’s preferences at that time,
rather than relying primarily on oversight and ex post rewards and punishments to control the agency.73
The theoretical innovation of applying principal–agent models to the
public bureaucracy provoked a great deal of empirical work, much of it intended to test the theory of “congressional dominance”—the claim that
members of Congress controlled sufficient incentives to effectively influence agency decisionmaking.74 The results of this work have been mixed,
68

Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 249 (1987).
69
See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins, The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure, 29 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 721, 722 (1985); McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 68, at 254; Matthew D. McCubbins,
Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 440 (1989).
70
See McCubbins, supra note 69, at 725–27.
71
See McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 69, at 444.
72
Id.; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 68, at 261. McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast provide a number of examples of deck-stacking. For example, “cumbersome procedures . . . favor . . . wellorganized, well-financed interests.” Id. at 262. The burden of proof “determin[es] which side will be
given the benefit of the doubt.” Id. Additionally, Congress can limit an agency’s ability to set its own
rulemaking agenda. Id. at 267. Congress may even “subsidize” participation by particular interest
groups to ensure their input into agency decisions. Id. at 266.
73
See McCubbins, supra note 69, at 744 (hypothesizing that “Congress as the principal selects an
institutional arrangement with its agent so as to maximize the benefit it derives from the agent’s performance”). This emphasis on ex ante structural and procedural controls departs from traditional agency
theory, which focuses on monitoring and incentives. As Gary Miller writes:
The directors of a firm clearly specify to the CEO that they expect[] profits—but they do not constrain the CEO by specifying a particular procedure, especially one that may benefit a single subset
of investors. Any such procedure would only constrain the profit-maximizing activities of the
CEO, and would require constant monitoring either by the board (which is unlikely) or by an external court system (equally unlikely). As a result, the procedural-control argument, although it
has been extremely productive of innovative research in political science, represents a discontinuity with PAT, rather than a simple extension of it.
Miller, supra note 43, at 215; see also Edgar Kiser, Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and Sociology: An Illustration from State Policy Implementation, 17 SOC.
THEORY 146, 156 (1999) (noting that the role of administrative procedures is largely absent from the
economics agency literature).
74
Weingast, supra note 62, at 148 (“The mechanisms evolved by Congress over the past one hundred years comprise an ingenious system for control of agencies that involves little direct congressional
monitoring of decisions but which nonetheless results in policies desired by Congress.”).
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with some studies finding support for the theory that agency actions are
shaped by congressional preferences,75 while others have concluded that
certain agencies are relatively unconstrained in their ability to pursue their
own goals.76 Still other empirical studies have focused more specifically on
whether particular structural controls or procedural requirements are effective in constraining and guiding agency discretion, again with mixed results.77
Although most of the work in this area is ostensibly positive in nature,
it is motivated by a deeper normative concern about policymaking by unelected bureaucrats. As Weingast argues, “Voters and citizens are the ultimate principals of the policymaking process, and congressmen are their
agents.”78 Elected officials face frequent reelection, creating incentives for
them to act in the interests of their constituents. In the modern administrative state, however, these elected officials delegate significant authority to
bureaucratic agencies to articulate and implement public policy. The bureaucratic officials who staff these agencies thus wield significant power to
shape policies that affect the public interest, yet they are not directly answerable to any voting constituency and do not have to face reelection. This
situation raises concerns about whether their policy decisions reflect the interests and preferences of the electorate.79 Thus, determining whether and
how elected officials control agency policymaking is closely related to
questions about the legitimacy of bureaucratic actions.
Even though the principal–agent model has become a widely accepted
tool for studying Congress–agency relations, some cautionary notes have
been raised. In particular, Terry Moe argues that contractual theories of organization, like the principal–agent paradigm, “developed with reference to
private organizations, particularly business firms, and that some of its most
75

See, e.g., id. at 181 (concluding that “[t]he evidence presented shows that Congress played the
key role in the change in SEC policy” regarding deregulation); Weingast & Moran, supra note 61, at
791 (concluding that Congress has “substantial . . . influence” over the FTC); B. Dan Wood & Richard
W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801, 821
(1991) (finding evidence of political control over seven different federal agencies).
76
See, e.g., B. Dan Wood, Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements,
82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 213, 229 (1988) (concluding that “a principal-agent model fail[s] to explain the
longitudinal variations in EPA clean air outputs” and that bureaucracies “are themselves responsible for
much of the variation and substance of public policy through time”).
77
Compare Steven J. Balla, Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy,
92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 663, 670–71 (1998) (failing to find empirical support for the theory that the notice-and-comment process will favor certain constituencies in the manner posited by the deck-stacking
thesis), with David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 445–46 (1999) (finding empirical support for the claim that structural
choices and, to a lesser extent, procedural controls affect agency decisionmaking, although the effects
were not necessarily foreseen by political officials).
78
Weingast, supra note 62, at 151.
79
See McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 68, at 243 (raising the concern that unelected bureaucrats will not comply with the political preferences of elected officials); Weingast, supra note 62, at
151 (asking whether bureaucratic agencies serve congressional constituents or their own interests).
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fundamental components must be modified if its application to public organizations is to be meaningful and instructive.”80 He points out that politicians, whose role is analogized to that of the entrepreneur, are not primarily
motivated by productive efficiency but by electoral considerations.81 Thus,
they are not “in the conventional sense, seeking an optimally balanced set
of hierarchical controls and monitoring mechanisms.”82 Similarly, bureaucratic officials are not primarily seeking to maximize their own profit but
may be driven by a number of motivations: “budgets, slack, policy, career
opportunities, and security.”83 This “expanded set of motivators” makes it
more difficult to predict with confidence the efficacy of various controls
and incentives.84 Moe notes additional difficulties: public agencies are not
subject to the discipline of the market;85 they create no economic surplus
analogous to the residual in the private firm that can be used to shape incentives;86 and political officials are severely constrained in their ability to select agents and design incentive structures, especially compared with the
entrepreneur of the economic models.87 Thus, he concludes that “there are
good reasons for thinking that bureaucratic control is much different for the
public sector than the private sector, and that a straightforward application
of contractual [principal–agent] theories and their implications is likely to
be very misleading.”88
III. PRINCIPAL–AGENT THEORY AND THE JUDICIAL HIERARCHY
As Moe argues, the facile analogy between the private and public bureaucracy overlooks important differences between the two, such that applying the principal–agent model in the latter context may be misleading.
The risks are even greater when principal–agent theory is applied to the
judicial hierarchy, which differs even more significantly from the economic
model. In this Part, I first explore the fit between principal–agent theories
and the realities of the federal judicial branch. Next, I consider how relying
on a principal–agent model may obscure important normative questions and
descriptive features of the judicial hierarchy.
80

Moe, supra note 38, at 761.
Id.
82
Id.
83
See id. at 764.
84
See id.
85
Id. at 762.
86
Id. at 763. Moe argues that “slack is not a functional substitute for the economic residual.” Id. at
764. Unlike the residual for a firm, which results from greater efficiency, slack, by definition, becomes
more available as the operation becomes more inefficient. Thus, utilizing slack to motivate bureaucrats
has “its own distinctive consequences for bureaucratic efficiency and control.” Id.
87
See id. at 765. Further difficulties in effectively using control mechanisms arise because Congress cannot foresee the policy issues an agency will face in the future. See David B. Spence, Agency
Policy Making and Political Control: Modeling Away the Delegation Problem, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &
THEORY 199, 203–04, 206 (1997).
88
Moe, supra note 38, at 765.
81
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A. Assessing Theory Fit
Each of the three conceptions of agency explored above takes a different perspective on the relationship: legal doctrine focuses on the extent of
the legal duty owed by an agent to her principal; economic theories aim to
determine what forms of contracting will minimize agency costs; and work
in political science asks about the extent of control that political principals
in fact exercise over their bureaucratic agents. Though focused on different
questions, these conceptions of the principal–agent relationship share certain core elements and offer a number of insights and analytic tools for
studying hierarchical relationships. More specifically, they emphasize the
difficulty of controlling the actions of the agent given conflicts of interest
between agent and principal and highlight the role of informational asymmetries in allowing agents to shirk. In addition, they suggest the significance of monitoring and outcome-based incentives in shaping agent
behavior.
In many ways, the federal judicial hierarchy resembles the types of relationships fruitfully analyzed under principal–agent theories. Whether its
primary function is understood as dispute resolution or announcing legal
principles, the Supreme Court cannot possibly fulfill this role alone. The
hundreds of federal district and court of appeals judges are crucial for resolving the hundreds of thousands of disputes brought to federal court annually, and their application of legal doctrines across a wide variety of
factual settings is essential to give meaning to the law. Although the Supreme Court does not literally delegate its work to the lower courts, it clearly stands in a hierarchical relationship to them, exercising supervisory
authority over them. It is empowered to reverse individual decisions and to
establish precedent that the lower courts are obligated to follow.89
Analogizing this structure to an agency relationship highlights the challenges confronting the Supreme Court. As judicial politics scholars have
emphasized, lower court judges do not necessarily share the goals and policy preferences of the Supreme Court. The resulting value conflicts mean
that the Supreme Court faces the classic problem of the principal—ensuring
that the lower courts pursue its interests and not their own. As in the traditional contracting situation, the Court cannot provide complete, detailed instructions directing the lower courts how to decide in every instance. Due
to some combination of the limitations of language, an inability to anticipate issues, and a need for flexibility in application, Court precedent inevitably allows circuit and district judges some discretion in applying its
precedents.90
89

See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 817, 823–25 (1994) (explaining the doctrine of hierarchical precedent).
90
See Kim, supra note 8, at 408–17. Similarly, the need to accommodate differing views among
the Justices or uncertainty about the best rule over a broad range of cases may limit the Court’s ability to
give comprehensive directions to the lower courts through its opinions. See id.
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The possibility of “moral hazard” arises because lower court judges
may have different goals than the Supreme Court and, at the same time,
have a great deal more information about their actions than their judicial
superiors. Although in theory the Supreme Court can monitor individual
decisions and reverse those with which it disagrees, its ability to do so is
constrained by its limited resources and the requirement that a party must
first petition for certiorari. Due to the sheer volume of lower court activity,
the Supreme Court is unlikely to know much about any particular decision
unless one of the parties petitions for certiorari. Even then, the Court must
sort through thousands of petitions, from which it selects fewer than one
hundred to decide on the merits each year.91 Given these constraints, the
lower courts have an informational advantage, which may permit them to
pursue their own goals rather than the Supreme Court’s. Thus, principal–
agent theory usefully highlights the existence of value conflicts within the
judicial hierarchy and the role of informational asymmetries in giving lower
court judges opportunities to depart from Supreme Court preferences.
Upon closer examination, however, many of the core elements of the
principal–agent relationship apply to the federal judiciary only with some
strain. Take, for example, the consensual basis of the agency relationship.
In both legal doctrine and economic theory, agency depends upon the parties’ assent to a particular type of relationship.92 The lawyer, employee, or
manager is an agent because she has agreed to act on behalf of the client,
employer, or shareholders. And although elected officials do not enter into
explicit contracts with bureaucratic officials, the members of Congress who
create an agency, define its mission, and then participate in appointing its
leaders have an implicit relational contract with the members of the bureaucracy.
By contrast, the Supreme Court does not contract with federal appellate
and trial judges in any meaningful sense. It does not appoint circuit or district judges and cannot structure the terms of their appointments. Instead,
the relationships between the various levels of the federal judiciary are
structured by Congress, within the bounds set by the Constitution.93 It is
Congress that authorizes the creation of the lower federal courts,94 funds
these courts,95 and establishes the initial bounds of their jurisdiction.96 And
91

In recent years, the percentage of petitions granted review by the Supreme Court has hovered
around 1% of all cases and 4% of the paid docket. The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—The Statistics,
123 HARV. L. REV. 382, 389 tbl.II(B) (2009); The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—The Statistics,
122 HARV. L. REV. 516, 523 tbl.II(B) (2008); The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—The Statistics,
121 HARV. L. REV. 436, 444 tbl.II(B) (2007).
92
See supra Part II.A–B.
93
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).
94
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 43 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 132 (2006).
95
See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 984–86 (2002) (describing Congress’s power over
the judiciary’s budget).
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it is the President, with the approval of the Senate, who selects the individuals who staff them.97 Thus, the Supreme Court lacks any direct role in establishing, structuring, or staffing the lower federal courts that is
comparable to either the economic principal’s contracting power or Congress’s ability to create and shape administrative agencies and to participate
in the selection of their leaders.
The absence of a consent-based relationship between the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts matters for agency theory because many of
the usual tools for minimizing agency costs are unavailable. One strategy
employed by principals to combat the problem of adverse selection is to
choose a form of contract more likely to attract high quality agents, which
can reduce monitoring and other costs down the road. Similarly, the Congress–bureaucracy literature highlights the selection of loyal bureaucratic
agents as one method of exercising political control over agencies.98 In the
context of the judicial hierarchy, however, the Supreme Court does not try
to ensure the appointment of loyal “agents” because it simply has no direct
role in the selection process. To the extent that there is an adverse selection
problem, it is one that confronts the political branches responsible for selecting and appointing federal judges. And depending upon existing political alignments, the political branches may seek to determine the true “type”
of a judicial nominee in an effort to select lower court judges who do not
share the goals of the sitting Supreme Court.99 To the extent that the concept of adverse selection has any relevance to the judicial hierarchy, it suggests that the President and Congress should be regarded as the principals
of the lower federal court judges.
The contracting process is also important in traditional principal–agent
theories because it enables the principal to structure the relationship in a
way that better aligns the agent’s incentives with the principal’s interests.
Principals use a variety of carrots and sticks to reward effort and punish
shirking. In the case of the judicial hierarchy, however, the Supreme Court
96

See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2; see also, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1292 (2006) (defining the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals); id. §§ 1331–1338 (establishing the original jurisdiction of the district
courts).
97
28 U.S.C. § 44 (empowering the President, with “the advice and consent of the Senate,” to appoint federal circuit judges); id. § 133 (prescribing the same for federal district judges).
98
See, e.g., Calvert, McCubbins & Weingast, supra note 64, at 604–05.
99
The President and Senate are likely to seek appointment of federal judges who reflect their current preferences. To the extent that those preferences diverge from those of the sitting Supreme Court,
they will not be seeking to appoint faithful agents of the Supreme Court but rather lower court judges
who are likely to resist pursuing the Supreme Court’s preferences. McNollgast has suggested that the
political branches might “pack” the lower courts in order to force the Supreme Court to alter doctrine
with which the political branches disagree. See McNollgast, supra note 3, at 1634. Of course, this analysis assumes that the President and the Senate pursue policy goals in the judicial appointments process,
begging the normative question of what “type” they ought to be seeking when appointing federal judges.
Other personal characteristics such as integrity, judicial temperament, and legal ability should also be
relevant.
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has none of the usual levers of control to shape the incentives of lower court
judges. It cannot promote, demote, or fire them; raise or lower their compensation; or determine the conditions of their employment. The only sanction available to the Supreme Court is its ability to reverse decisions with
which it disagrees.
Many principal–agent models regard reversal as a disciplinary tool.100
However, reversal alone is insufficient to ensure compliance with the Supreme Court’s goals where the lower federal courts have differing goals. In
any given case, the actual risk of reversal is quite low. The Supreme Court
currently reviews less than 1% of court of appeals decisions,101 and district
court decisions have an even lower chance of review by the Supreme
Court.102 Of course, the Court need not actually reverse in order to have an
effect on lower court decisionmaking. The threat of reversal may be sufficient to induce lower courts to comply. As Songer, Segal, and Cameron
have suggested, “[T]he ‘paradox’ of (relatively) effective control and rare
reversals is more apparent than real” because appeals courts anticipate reversal and therefore comply without the need for the Supreme Court to actually review and reverse.103 In order for the threat of sanction to be
effective, however, it must be a credible threat, and yet the Supreme Court’s
capacity for increasing the number of cases it reviews is quite limited relative to the number of lower court decisions issued each year.104
100

See, e.g., Benesh & Reddick, supra note 1, at 536; Cameron, Segal & Songer, supra note 1, at
102; George & Yoon, supra note 1, at 822; Randazzo, supra note 1, at 673; Songer, Segal & Cameron,
supra note 1, at 693.
101
For example, in 2008, the United States courts of appeals terminated 28,918 cases on the merits,
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 12 tbl.B-5
(Dec. 2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederal
Judiciary/2008/dec08/B05Dec08.pdf, while the Supreme Court accepted only 87 cases for review in the
October 2008 term, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—The Statistics, supra note 91, at 389 tbl.II(B).
Even if all the cases in which certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court came from the federal circuit
courts, the rate of review would be about 0.3%. Cf. id. (using the Court’s 2008 total number of cases
granted certiorari to calculate the percentage). Given that some of these cases involved appeals from
decisions by state supreme courts, the rate of review of federal circuit court decisions is even lower.
102
The percentage of United States district court cases ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court is
even lower because of the much higher caseload volume in the district courts. For example, in 2008, the
district courts terminated by court action more than 178,000 civil actions, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 37 tbl.C-4 (Dec. 2008), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2008/dec08/C04De
c08.pdf, and adjudicated nearly 72,000 criminal cases, id. at 51 tbl.D-1, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2008/dec08/D01C
Dec08.pdf. Of these, less than 0.04% are likely to ever be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Cf. The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—The Statistics, supra note 91, at 389 tbl.II(B) (using the total number of cases
to which the Court granted certiorari in 2008 to calculate the percentage).
103
Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 693.
104
Commentators have noted the Supreme Court’s reduced plenary docket in recent years and debated its causes and consequences. See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The
Supreme Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737 (2001); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403; David M. O’Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule
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Even an infrequent sanction may be effective if the costs it imposes are
sufficiently large. In the case of reversal, the primary cost to the lower
court judge is the loss of her preferred outcome, which is identical to the
loss she would have experienced if she had decided according to the Supreme Court’s preference in the first place. Thus, fear of reversal can operate as an effective sanction only if it imposes other costs—such as
damaging a judge’s reputation or decreasing her chances for promotion.105
Although judges undoubtedly dislike being reversed, it is unclear that they
actually suffer reputational harm or lost opportunities as a result or that the
costs of reversal are significant enough to dominate other judicial motivations.106 The handful of relevant empirical studies have failed to find evidence that fear of reversal drives lower court decisionmaking.107 Thus, the
Supreme Court’s reversal power alone is arguably a weak tool for ensuring
compliance across the mass of cases decided by the lower federal courts.
When monitoring is difficult in the private contracting situation, one
common solution is to compensate the agent in part based on outcome, thereby giving the agent an incentive to work hard in order to share in a larger
residual.108 Moe points out, however, that “[f]or public bureaucra-

of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779 (1997);
Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1363 (2006). Although the Court could likely increase the number of cases it hears each
year, it nevertheless faces significant resource constraints given the volume of lower court decisions.
Even if the Supreme Court increased its output five-fold—a heroic assumption—it could still only review about 1.5% of federal court of appeals cases decided on the merits. See supra note 101.
105
See, e.g., Cameron, Segal & Songer, supra note 1, at 102 (asserting that frequent reversal brings
derision of colleagues and decline in professional status); George & Yoon, supra note 1, at 822 (arguing
that lower court judges believe that their chance of promotion depends upon reversal rates).
106
See JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS 44–45 (2002) (concluding, in
part based on interviews with circuit judges, that federal appellate judges are not motivated significantly
by either a fear of reversal or a desire to be appointed to a higher court); Kim, supra note 8, at 401–02
(questioning whether reversals in fact harm judges’ reputations or prospects for promotion); Richard A.
Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 1, 14 (1993) (“Judges don’t like to be reversed (I speak from experience), but aversion to
reversal does not figure largely in the judicial utility function.”).
107
See, e.g., DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 126
(2002) (reporting results of various empirical tests that offered “essentially no evidence that [courts of
appeals’ deference to Supreme Court preferences] results from fear of reversal”); Richard S. Higgins &
Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 130, 137–38 (1980) (finding no evidence that
judges who are more likely to be eligible for promotion are more sensitive to the risk of reversal); David
E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 579, 600–03 (2003) (finding no evidence that circuit courts follow Supreme Court preferences more closely in cases that are more likely to be reviewed and hence pose a greater risk of reversal
but concluding that the lower courts generally adhere to Supreme Court preferences despite the low
chance of reversal); Donald R. Songer, Martha Humphries Ginn & Tammy A. Sarver, Do Judges Follow
the Law When There Is No Fear of Reversal?, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 137, 138 (2003) (concluding that circuit
judges generally followed the law in diversity cases, even though the risk of review and reversal in these
types of cases is negligible).
108
See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
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cy . . . there is no residual in the ordinary sense.”109 Policy outcomes are not
functionally equivalent to an economic surplus because they cannot be distributed in the same way, and this observation applies to the judicial hierarchy as well. Judicial politics scholars assume that judges seek to
maximize their preferred policies, just as private economic actors try to
maximize their wealth. The policy outputs they produce, though, are not
the functional equivalent of a firm’s residual. For the lower court judge
who disagrees with the Supreme Court’s policy, it is no reward to be allowed to share in any policy surplus created by faithful adherence to the
Supreme Court’s wishes. Thus, the usual economic strategy of compensating based on outcome is unlikely to be effective where the agent’s interests
do not diverge from the principal’s because the agent wishes to expend less
effort but because a fundamental value conflict exists.
In the federal judicial hierarchy, then, almost none of the usual tools
for shaping agent incentives are available to the Supreme Court. It cannot
influence the compensation or job tenure of lower court judges, and there is
no residual with which to reward faithful effort. In some ways this situation
reverses the logic of the economic theories. In traditional principal–agent
relationships, the principal cannot alter the outcome—which is determined
in part by the actions of the agent—and so it uses incentives to induce the
agent to produce the desired outcome. In the case of the Supreme Court,
the opposite is true—it has the ability to reverse outcomes it dislikes but
generally lacks the ability to structure incentives for lower court judges
prospectively.
Principal–agent theory proves an awkward fit with the federal judicial
hierarchy in another way as well. As discussed above, one of the core aspects of agency relationships is that the agent has the power to impact the
interests of the principal. In common law agency relationships, this power
consists of the agent’s ability to legally bind the principal, altering its rights
and obligations vis-à-vis third parties.110 In economic theories, the concept
of impact is much broader, encompassing any situation in which the agent’s
actions (together with some exogenous element) will determine the outcome and hence the payoff to the principal.111 For example, greater effort
on the part of a manager will increase profits for the shareholders, while
shirking or self-dealing will reduce the surplus. The Congress–bureaucracy
literature departs from the assumption that the parties are wealthmaximizing and assumes instead that elected officials are interested in reelection. On this view, the activities of bureaucratic agents impact the interests of their political principal to the extent that their actions please or
displease the principal’s electoral constituency.112 In each of these situa109

See Moe, supra note 38, at 763.
See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
111
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
112
See Weingast & Moran, supra note 61, at 768 (explaining that members of Congress “gauge the
success of [agency] programs through their constituents’ reactions”); Weingast, supra note 62, at 151
110
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tions, however, it is the agent’s impact on the principal’s interests that motivates and justifies the latter’s efforts to exercise control.
Applying principal–agent theory to the judicial hierarchy raises a question—in what ways do the actions of lower court judges impact the interests
of the Supreme Court? The answer to that question in turn depends upon
how one understands the interests of the Court. Certainly, there is no impact on the Justices’ individual material interests, for nothing that lower
court judges do will affect either the compensation or the tenure of Supreme
Court Justices. Judicial politics scholars instead assume that the goal of
judges—their true interest—is to enact their policy preferences through
their decisions.113 But this assumption requires further elaboration. Unlike
Congress, the Supreme Court is not explicitly cast as a policymaking body.
Instead, what the Court does is decide cases, and in doing so, it establishes
doctrine—precedent—that often embodies certain policy choices. What,
then, does it mean for lower court decisions to impact the Court’s interests—i.e., its policy goals? If the Supreme Court has decided a case that establishes a certain doctrine, are its interests adversely affected if a lower
court applies the doctrine but reaches a different substantive outcome? Or
are its interests harmed only if the lower court refuses to apply the doctrine
at all?
To take a concrete example, in Garcetti v. Ceballos the Supreme Court
rejected the claim of a district attorney who alleged that his First Amendment rights had been violated when he was disciplined for writing a memo
critical of the actions of the police during an investigation.114 Although it
had previously held that the First Amendment protects public employees
when they speak out on matters of public concern,115 the Court in Garcetti
held that when public employees speak “pursuant to their official duties,
[they] are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes,” and
therefore, their speech is not constitutionally protected.116 Because the district attorney had prepared the memo as part of his official duties, his claim
was dismissed.117 Suppose, in a subsequent case, a lower court rejected the
Supreme Court’s Garcetti holding, or simply ignored it, thereby permitting
a public employee to claim retaliation based on speech made pursuant to her
(asking whether agencies benefit congressional constituencies and hence provide electoral benefits to
members of Congress). The impact of bureaucratic action on the interests of political officials, however,
is indirect; it depends upon whether public attention is focused on the bureaucracy and on the degree to
which elected officials are viewed as responsible for agency outputs. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 65, at 167–68 (explaining how members of Congress maximize support by remedying violations brought to their attention by supporters rather than by searching out violations that supporters do
not know about and thus cannot reward them for remedying).
113
See supra note 4.
114
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 415–17 (2006).
115
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144–46 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568–70 (1968).
116
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
117
See id. at 421–24.
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official duties. Such a decision would clearly have a negative impact on the
Supreme Court’s interest in establishing its policy, not to mention that it
would violate well-established legal norms. But suppose instead that a
lower court cites and applies the holding in Garcetti and then concludes that
the public employee’s speech that forms the basis of the claim was not
made “pursuant to official duties” and allows the claim to proceed.118 Its
decision is arguably consistent with Garcetti’s reasoning and therefore does
not violate legal norms, but by permitting the plaintiff’s claim, it reaches an
outcome different from that in Garcetti. Does such a decision impact the
Supreme Court’s interests?
If the Supreme Court’s interest lies in establishing the general policy,
then the answer would seem to be “no.” The lower court has affirmed and
applied the policy set out by the Court—“no First Amendment protection
for speech made pursuant to official duties”—although perhaps its application differs from what the Court would have decided in the same case. The
Court’s goals, however, might be understood more broadly—that is, its interests might be defined to include not only having its precedents followed
but also having outcomes in the lower courts coincide with its preferences.
On this view, the Supreme Court’s interests would be impaired by the lower
court that applied the Garcetti holding as written but interpreted it to permit
a public employee’s claim to go forward where the Court would not have
allowed it.119
Of course the Supreme Court might have given clearer instructions if it
cared only about outcome—for example, establishing a blanket rule that
public employee speech is not protected by the First Amendment or is only
protected if it does not fall within the employee’s written job description.
Instead, the Garcetti opinion suggested that a mechanical test based on
written job descriptions is inappropriate and stated that determining the
scope of an employee’s official duties is a “practical” inquiry.120 By qualifying its holding in this way, the Court deliberately left open some discretionary space in which the exercise of judgment by lower court judges is not
only inevitable but expected.121 Given that the Court created that discretio118

See, e.g., Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924, 932–33 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that plaintiff’s allegations of “corrupt overpayment schemes” were not part of his official job duties as chief engineer);
Lindsey v. City of Orrick, 491 F.3d 892, 897–98 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that the plaintiff’s speech—
complaints that the defendant violated state open meetings law—was not part of his job duties as public
works director); cf. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding that a
police officer’s testimony at the trial of a fellow officer is speech as a citizen and that his claim of retaliation for that speech therefore was not foreclosed by Garcetti).
119
This control over outcomes is what many judicial politics scholars assume represents the Supreme Court’s interests, and they therefore characterize divergent outcomes as “shirking.” See, e.g.,
Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 692–93; see also George & Yoon, supra note 1, at 822 (raising the concern that “lower court judges may make decisions that are different from those that the
Court would otherwise have made”).
120
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.
121
See Kim, supra note 8, at 442.
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nary space, is the lower court judge who applies the doctrine but reaches a
different substantive outcome acting contrary to the Court’s policy goals or
not? Because the Court, by definition, has not issued a clear policy statement in this area, it is difficult to tell. The point here is that defining the
principal’s interest as a policy goal—rather than an economic one—
complicates the idea that the agent’s actions can impact the principal’s interests.122 In the case of the judicial hierarchy, it becomes more difficult to
determine whether a particular lower court decision advances the Supreme
Court’s interests or constitutes “shirking.”
B. Limitations of Principal–Agent Theories
Because the Supreme Court and lower federal courts are not in a direct
contractual relationship and because they are presumed to pursue policy
goals rather than wealth-maximization, principal–agent theories do not precisely fit the circumstances of the federal judicial hierarchy. Of course, the
purpose of using models is to simplify reality, and no model will fully capture the complexity of actual institutions. The usefulness of a model thus
depends not on the precise degree of fit with actual circumstances but on
whether it advances or impedes our understanding. In many ways, principal–agent theories have pushed forward our understanding of judicial decisionmaking. Attitudinal models tended to focus solely on the preferences
of the individual judge. The application of principal–agent theories led to
greater attention to institutional context and emphasized the importance of
interactions between courts in shaping judicial behavior.
Utilizing a principal–agent framework, scholars have produced important insights about such issues as the role of litigants in influencing monitoring by the Supreme Court,123 the Court’s strategies for selecting cases for
review,124 and how interactions with lower courts might shape the Court’s
choice of doctrine.125 As I argue below, however, relying on a principal–
agent model also has some costs because it obscures important normative
questions as well as some significant descriptive features of the judicial hierarchy.
1. Normative Questions.—Much of the scholarship on the judicial
hierarchy is imbued with an implicit normative cast. Scholars write about
lower court judges “shirking,”126 “sabotag[ing],”127 “running amok,”128 or, on
the other hand, acting as “faithful agents”129 pursuing the policies of their
122

Moe raises an analogous question by asking what it means for Congress to control the bureaucracy and arguing that theories of congressional dominance are quite vague about whether control means
that agency actions reflect the goals of Congress as a whole, those of the relevant legislative committees,
or those of key individual members of Congress. See Moe, supra note 64, at 482–83.
123
See Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 688–90.
124
See Cameron, Segal & Songer, supra note 1; Spitzer & Talley, supra note 1.
125
See Bueno de Mesquita & Stephenson, supra note 5; Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1; McNollgast,
supra note 3.
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superiors. These studies of lower court behavior purport to be asking positive questions about how circuit and district court judges decide cases.
Nevertheless, the language used to frame them reveals the normative assumption that often underlies them—namely that lower court judges should
pursue the Supreme Court’s interests rather than their own or some other interests. This assumption follows naturally from the application of principal–agent theories, in which agents have a duty to act on behalf of the
principal, but it is never explicitly justified in the context of the judiciary.
Under the common law of agency, the source of the duty is clear—the
agent is obligated to advance the principal’s interests because of the contractual agreement between them. The contract not only empowers the
agent to act on the principal’s behalf, it also binds her to do so as a fiduciary. Similarly, economic theories of agency assume that the principal has
a right to expect the agent to act on its behalf based on the contractual relationship between them. To return to the earlier cited examples, the employee, the manager, and the tenant farmer, having agreed to the agency
relationship, should not act in a way that is harmful to the principal’s interest. The main difference between the legal and economic approaches is that
the former relies on a legally enforceable standard of behavior, while the
latter emphasizes the structure of the contractual relationship itself to promote compliance with this expectation.
When applied to the public bureaucracy, the principal–agent model similarly places normative demands on the agent’s behavior. The extensive
bureaucracy, whose officials are unelected, poses a threat to representative
democracy unless the actions of the bureaucratic officials are controlled by
elected officials. Thus, scholars have debated whether members of Congress or the President in fact control the agencies, thereby making them responsive to the needs of the electorate.130 Much of this literature assumes
that bureaucrats should pursue the policy goals of Congress and that greater
political control of the bureaucracy is desirable. Several scholars, however,
have questioned this underlying normative premise. David Spence, for example, argues that “the assumption that more political control is better is at
least debatable,”131 while Brian Cook asks whether the status of public bureaucracies “as agents of popularly elected executives and legislatures
[should be] the subject of debate rather than the accepted point of departure
for theory building.”132 Others have questioned whether agencies should be
126

See, e.g., Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 693.
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See supra Part II.C.
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Spence, supra note 87, at 215. Spence raises the question of whether political control may in
fact facilitate agency capture. See id. at 215–16.
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Brian J. Cook & B. Dan Wood, Debate, Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureaucracy, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 965, 970 (1989).
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controlled by current political leaders133 or instead should be responsive to
prior officials—that is, “all of those static coalitions from the past that successfully had their policy ambitions transformed into law.”134 Thus, a normative ambiguity underlies the classic Congress–bureaucracy literature:
whom should we view as the true principal of the bureaucratic agency? Put
differently, to whom does the bureaucratic agent owe a duty of loyalty—
current key members of Congress or the enacting political coalition that
created and empowered the agency?
The common assumption that the lower federal courts are agents with a
duty to act on behalf of the Supreme Court masks a similar normative question: why should lower federal court judges pursue the interests of the Supreme Court and not their own goals or some other interest? Perhaps
federal judges are better understood as agents (in the normative sense) of
Congress, particularly when they are interpreting statutes, or of the President who nominated them.135 Or perhaps the principal, whose interest they
should seek to advance, is the public or, more provocatively, the law.136 For
each of these hypothetical principals, serious questions exist regarding the
extent to which it could or does control the actions of federal district and
circuit court judges. However, the normative possibilities that lower court
judges should pursue these interests deserve consideration.
Positing that the Supreme Court is the appropriate principal, what reasons exist for requiring lower courts to pursue its preferences? Common
law agency doctrine and economic theories suggest that the obligation to
pursue the principal’s interests stems from the agent’s consent to the agency
relationship. As discussed above, however, there is no direct contractual relationship between the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, eliminating the usual basis for holding the agent to a fiduciary duty to act on
behalf of the principal. For the public bureaucracy, political control is justified by the need for representational legitimacy—that is, agency activity
should be controlled by Congress because the latter is more directly responsive to the needs and wishes of the public. This argument, however, is insufficient to support a normative claim that lower court judges should
pursue the interests of the Supreme Court. Even if one assumes that lower
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See, e.g., Weingast & Moran, supra note 61, at 768.
See B. Dan Wood, Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements,
82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 213, 231 (1988). On this view, agencies are “agents of the law who, by virtue of
delegated authority, are transformed into quasi principals.” Id.
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See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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Federal judges must swear their allegiance to the Constitution and the laws of the United States
upon taking office:
I, __________ __________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully
and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as __________ under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.
28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006).
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court judges should be responsive to the public in their decisionmaking,137
requiring them to pursue the preferences of the Supreme Court, which is also staffed by unelected judges, will not solve the need for representational
legitimacy. Although Supreme Court Justices are subject to greater scrutiny
during the appointment process than lower court judges, they will not necessarily be better representatives of public views, particularly over time.
Supreme Court nominees have become increasingly opaque in their responses during the confirmation process, making it difficult to know their
preferences.138 Once appointed, life tenure largely insulates the Justices
from the influence of shifting democratic majorities.139 If anything, Supreme Court Justices may be even less broadly representative in their backgrounds and less responsive to the public than circuit judges and especially
district judges, who are both more numerous and more deeply embedded in
particular legal communities.
What then is the basis for the common assumption that lower federal
court judges should pursue the goals of the Supreme Court? Undoubtedly it
relates to the principle of vertical stare decisis—the legal rule that courts
should follow the precedent of courts with revisory authority over them.140
Judicial politics scholars who have relied on principal–agent theories, however, have sometimes confused the legal norm—obey the precedent of the
superior court—with a quite different normative mandate—pursue the preferences of the superior court. Of course lower courts must follow the preferences of the Supreme Court to the extent that they are embodied in
legally binding precedents, but many judicial politics scholars have suggested that their duty extends further—to pursuing the interests and preferences of the Court even when not fully expressed in doctrine. For
example, Songer, Segal, and Cameron argue that “[i]f the circuit courts consisted of faithful agents, they would obediently follow the policy dictates
set down by the Supreme Court . . . [rather than] their own policy preferences.”141 Tracey George and Albert Yoon similarly raise as a concern
“the possibility . . . that judges will not comply with Supreme Court preferences.”142 It is only by mistakenly equating precedent and preferences that
137

One might just as forcefully argue that the role of the federal courts as a whole is to act as a
countermajoritarian institution. See, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, 37 U.
CHI. L. REV. 19, 45 (1969) (arguing that the most important function of the Supreme Court is antimajoritarian in that it is intended to protect minorities against oppression by majorities).
138
See, e.g., Richard Brust, No More Kabuki Confirmations, ABA J., Oct. 2009, at 38.
139
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
140
See Caminker, supra note 89, at 823–25 (explaining and justifying the doctrine of hierarchical
precedent).
141
Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 675.
142
George & Yoon, supra note 1, at 819; see also Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1, at 328 (describing
“policy errors” as policy outcomes disfavored by the higher court); Lindquist, Haire & Songer, supra
note 1, at 608 (“[C]ircuit court compliance with Supreme Court justices’ preferences for particular outcomes is far from assured . . . .”); cf. Clark, supra note 1, at 60 (explaining how an appellate panel, the
agent of the circuit, may “follow its own preferences and disregard the Circuit’s” preferences).
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the claim that the lower courts should pursue the interests of the Supreme
Court appears uncontroversial.
Scholars who make this assumption find evidence of “shirking” when
the relative proportion of liberal and conservative outcomes in the lower
courts does not mirror Supreme Court outcomes.143 As I have argued elsewhere, however, lower courts might reach divergent outcomes while still
complying with legal norms.144 Precedent—legal doctrine—inevitably affords discretion to lower courts in deciding cases, not only because of the
indeterminacy of language but also because of choices the Supreme Court
makes in framing its decisions.145 For example, if the Court chooses to issue a narrow rather than broad opinion, or opts for an open-ended standard
rather than a rigid rule, it will create discretionary spaces that afford lower
courts considerable leeway in deciding subsequent cases. And where legal
discretion exists, the exercise of judgment is permissible. The lower courts
are under no legal duty to follow Supreme Court preferences that have not
been articulated in the form of binding precedent.146 Recall the example of
the Garcetti case. If a circuit court finds that a public employee’s speech
was not made pursuant to her official duties and permits her First Amendment claim to proceed, it has followed the Garcetti decision, even though
the Supreme Court might have reached a different conclusion had it considered the same case. In short, a duty to follow precedent does not justify an
insistence that lower court judges pursue Supreme Court preferences regarding outcomes.
So far then the assumption that lower courts should pursue the interests
of the Supreme Court appears to lack justification. No explicit contract or
legal norm requires it, and concerns about democratic legitimacy cannot
explain it. Such a duty, however, might be explained on functional
grounds. The rule of vertical stare decisis is sometimes justified on grounds
of efficiency and uniformity.147 According to this argument, lower courts
should follow Supreme Court precedent, even when they disagree with it,
because to do otherwise would waste judicial resources, delay resolution,
and result in inconsistent outcomes. A rule of vertical stare decisis advances the goals of efficiency and uniformity by expanding the power of the
Supreme Court, whose voice is decisive whenever there is disagreement
143

See, e.g., Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 692–93 (interpreting divergent patterns of
decisions by liberal and conservative appellate judges as evidence that they sometimes “shirk” by advancing their own policy preferences rather than those of the Supreme Court).
144
See Kim, supra note 8, at 410–12.
145
See id. at 414–15. Jacobi and Tiller have explored more formally the conditions under which
appellate courts might choose one type of doctrine, or “legal instrument,” rather than another. See Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1.
146
Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court
Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 n.20 (1994) (citing sources stating that lower courts should decide
cases based on existing precedents, not by predicting how higher courts are likely to decide the issue).
147
See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 89, at 839–56 (explaining consequentialist justifications for the
doctrine of hierarchical precedent).
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over the best rule to follow. It does not necessarily follow, however, that
the interests of efficiency and uniformity demand that lower court judges
also advance Supreme Court preferences, not just follow its precedents.148 I
have argued elsewhere that these consequentialist arguments do not support
expanding the duties of the lower courts in this way, and the main effect of
doing so would be to unduly concentrate power in the hands of the Justices.149
The latter point is best illustrated by considering the extreme case. If
the actions of the lower courts were easily observable and the Supreme
Court had infinite resources to monitor and correct their decisions, its agency problem would be solved, enabling it to exercise complete control over
the output of the hundreds of circuit and district judges who decide the
overwhelming mass of federal cases. In traditional principal–agent relationships, such a situation would generally be viewed as desirable. For example, it would be seen as a good thing if managers faithfully pursued the
interests of shareholders without engaging in self-dealing, or if the tenant
farmer invested a level of effort that maximized crop yield rather than opting for more leisure. But is it normatively attractive to imagine that the Supreme Court could ensure that all lower federal court judges precisely
followed its will? Would it be a good thing if such enormous power were
concentrated in the hands of nine unelected individuals?
If the Supreme Court itself were more directly responsive to governing
majorities, such a concentration of power might not be troubling.150 But
148

Evan H. Caminker makes a normative argument that, at least in some circumstances, lower
courts should decide cases according to their prediction of how superior courts would decide them. See
Caminker, supra note 146, at 35–66. More specifically, Caminker argues that lower court judges should
try to predict future Supreme Court decisions in cases in which “highly probative predictive data are
available—that is, when fragmented dispositional rules or well-considered dicta clearly foreshadow the
Supreme Court’s future direction.” Id. at 73. These circumstances are “admittedly narrow,” id. at 1, and
even if persuasive, Caminker’s arguments do not necessarily support a generalized duty to follow superior court preferences.
149
See Kim, supra note 8, at 436–40.
150
Barry Friedman argues that, throughout American history, the Supreme Court has been influenced by the views of the public because those views can motivate political leaders to follow the Court
or to discipline it. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 375 (2009) (“The Court has to be attuned to aroused public opinion because it is the public that can save a Court in trouble with political
leaders and likewise can motivate political leaders against it.”); see also id. at 370–71 (asserting that
“[t]he people and their elected representatives have had the ability . . . to assert pressure” on the Justices). While this is undoubtedly true to some degree, the question remains as to how responsive the Court
actually is to public opinion. Compare, e.g., id. at 375 (claiming that the Supreme Court Justices may be
influenced by public opinion because “they care about preserving the Court’s institutional power . . . [and] about not being disciplined by politics”), and POSNER, supra note 7, at 375 (asserting that
Supreme Court Justices are reined in by awareness “that they cannot go ‘too far’ without inviting reprisals by the other branches of government spurred on by an indignant public”), with JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 424–28 (2002)
(arguing that there is no evidence that public opinion directly influences the Supreme Court), and Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98
GEO. L.J. 1515 (2010) (asserting that the Supreme Court is responsive to elites, not public opinion). Ri-
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currently, the levers that public officials wield over the Supreme Court are
quite weak. The combination of life tenure, no mandatory retirement age,
and increased longevity means that turnover on the Court has become increasingly infrequent.151 Thus, the opportunities for elected officials to alter
the composition of the United States Supreme Court are “fitful and irregular,”152 and the chance to change its ideological balance is rarer still.153
Thus, scholars have noted the risk that “the Court will embody a lagging
average of electoral politics and attempt to impose upon today’s governing
coalition the views of yesterday’s governing coalition.”154 Of course the political branches have a variety of tools, such as court-packing and jurisdiction-stripping, to try to influence the decisions of the Court,155 but the
effectiveness of these tools in actually constraining the Justices has been a
matter of debate.156 Given that political control is necessarily limited, some
diffusion of power to the lower courts may be a useful antidote to the risk of
excessive Supreme Court power, particularly if it turns out that the composition of the lower courts is more fluid and therefore more responsive to
shifting political coalitions.
A good deal more analytical and empirical work is required to determine the optimal balance between centralization and diffusion of judicial

chard Pildes not only questions the descriptive claim that political majorities constrain the Supreme
Court but also challenges whether the “majoritarian thesis” can answer moral questions about the legitimacy of judicial review or assure that the Court’s judicial review power will be appropriately limited in
the future. Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV.
103. Of course, the extent to which the Supreme Court should be responsive to public opinion is also a
matter of controversy. See FRIEDMAN, supra, at 372–74 (worrying that Justices follow public opinion
too closely and thus fail to fulfill “the traditional role of judicial review in protecting minority rights”).
That latter debate, however, addresses the proper roles of the different branches of government, while
my focus here is on the relationship—and the allocation of power—between the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts.
151
See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 777–89 (2006); see also Pildes, supra note 150, at 139–41
(arguing that the appointments process is a much weaker mechanism for political control over the Supreme Court than it was in the past).
152
David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV.
1545, 1589 (2009).
153
See Keith Krehbiel, Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game, 51 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 231, 238–39 (2007).
154
See Law, supra note 152, at 1589 & n.266.
155
See, e.g., John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 981–94 (2002) (reviewing tools available to political branches to try to control the judiciary as a whole, such as the appointment power and Congress’s
ability to control the judiciary’s budget and to limit its subject matter jurisdiction).
156
Compare, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 150, at 375 (asserting that the Court has responded to attempts by the political branches to discipline it through actions such as court-packing and jurisdictionstripping), with SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 150, at 424–25 (arguing that “if Congress has virtually no
direct influence on the Court, it is hardly likely that the influence of public opinion will flow indirectly
through Congress”), and Pildes, supra note 150, at 133–39 (questioning the effectiveness of the tools
available to Congress to curb the Supreme Court).
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power.157 The point here is that questions of institutional design require that
we first explicate our normative goals—for example, whose interests should
district and circuit courts serve?—and then ask how various structures and
norms affect those goals. The widespread reliance on principal–agent theories to describe the judicial hierarchy has obscured these normative questions such that they have largely gone unasked.
2. Descriptive Features.—The reliance on principal–agent theories
has not only obscured important normative questions but also distorted our
understanding of certain descriptive features of the judicial hierarchy as
well. In particular, the principal–agent perspective and its focus on hierarchical control have reinforced a Supreme Court-centric view of the courts.
Susan Haire, Stefanie Lindquist, and Donald Songer write that “the federal
judicial hierarchy is designed to enable the Supreme Court, sitting at the
system’s apex, to impose its collective will on lower federal judges.”158 Although they go on to acknowledge that “the Court’s control is far from absolute,”159 it would be far more accurate to describe the federal judicial
hierarchy as a system designed to limit the Supreme Court’s ability to impose its collective will on lower courts.
If in fact the goal were to centralize power and strengthen discipline
over lower court judges, then the judicial branch would be structured quite
differently. For example, it might be designed much like the Japanese judiciary, whose ranks are composed of career judges who have been screened,
selected, and trained by a bureaucracy under the control of the Chief Justice
of the Japanese Supreme Court and an elite cadre of judges in the Secretariat.160 This administrative bureaucracy exercises power not only over lower court judges’ pay but over their assignments as well, thereby controlling
what type of cases they will hear, where they will live, and ultimately the
trajectories of their entire careers.161 These powers are wielded effectively
to discourage rulings out of line with the prevailing ideology.162 Alternatively, centralized control might be strengthened by holding judges personally accountable for their decisions and imposing sanctions for any case

157

For example, as Judith Resnik has observed, procedural rules of review entail choices to diffuse
or concentrate power among different types of judges or decisionmakers. See Judith Resnik, Tiers,
57 S. CAL. L. REV. 840, 850–51, 868–89 (1984). The reverse is also true: value choices regarding the
allocation of judicial power do and should inform decisions about institutional design, including rules of
procedure.
158
Haire, Lindquist & Songer, supra note 1, at 143–44.
159
Id. at 144.
160
See Law, supra note 152, at 1549–64.
161
Id. at 1556–58.
162
See id. at 1560–62 (describing the ability of the central bureaucracy to reward and sanction
judges for their decisions and explaining that “Japanese judges march out of ideological sync with the
bureaucracy at their own peril”).
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reversed on appeal, as occurs in China’s local courts.163 In comparison to
these robust tools for controlling subordinate judges in other judicial systems, the United States Supreme Court’s ability to control the lower federal
courts by reversing a tiny fraction of their decisions appears quite feeble.
Not only does the Supreme Court lack the tools to directly sanction
lower court judges, but legal norms further limit its supervisory powers as
well. For example, the general rule against permitting new evidence to be
considered at the appellate level164 and the standard of review requiring appellate courts to defer to a trial court’s factual findings165 exacerbate the
lower courts’ informational advantage. Even the Supreme Court’s reversal
power cannot be exercised unless the losing party petitions for certiorari. In
a system designed to maximize Supreme Court control, one might expect to
see rules that permit appellate courts to receive additional evidence, do not
require deference to the findings of trial courts, and allow the Justices to select any decision for review. That these features are not part of the federal
appellate system suggests that the institutional structure is designed to
achieve goals other than enhancing Supreme Court control. Thus, unlike
economic theories of agency, in which the need to control agency costs
helps explain the structure of the firm,166 a focus on agency costs cannot explain the existing institutional structure of the federal judiciary.
In addition, principal–agent theories tend to entrench a particular view
of the role of law in the judicial hierarchy. The common assumption of
these theories is that judges are primarily motivated by policy—that is, their
goal in deciding cases is to enact their policy preferences into law. In earlier work, this assumption led judicial politics scholars to dismiss law and
doctrine as mere rhetoric or window-dressing, a cover for judges’ true intentions.167 Thus, the study of court decisions at all levels of the judiciary
focused on judicial votes—typically examining the political valence of case
outcomes rather than analyzing the language of court opinions. This ap163

See, e.g., Carl F. Minzner, Riots and Cover-Ups: Counterproductive Control of Local Agents in
China, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 53, 72–74 (2009) (describing “responsibility systems” applied to Chinese
courts).
164
See, e.g., Tonry v. Sec. Experts, Inc., 20 F.3d 967, 974 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining the “basic tenet of appellate jurisprudence . . . that parties may not unilaterally supplement the record on appeal with
evidence not reviewed by the court below”); 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER,
EDWARD H. COOPER & CATHERINE T. STRUVE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3956.1 (4th ed.
2008) (noting that generally courts of appeals will not consider matter that is not part of the record
transmitted by the trial court).
165
See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) (“[R]eview of factual
findings under the clearly-erroneous standard—with its deference to the trier of fact—is the rule, not the
exception.”).
166
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 39, at 357.
167
See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 15, at 34 (arguing that “the legal model serves only to rationalize the Court’s decisions and to cloak the reality” that Justices decide cases based on their personal
policy preferences); id. at 363 (asserting that the legal model “masks the reality of choice based on the
individual justices’ personal policy preferences”).
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proach has been much criticized for failing to take seriously the law and legal institutions.168
More recently, judicial politics scholars have begun to focus their attention on the role that legal doctrine plays in the interaction between upper
and lower courts. Once again, the starting point is the assumption that
judges are primarily motivated by their policy goals; however, rather than
dismissing law as irrelevant, these scholars theorize that the law plays an
important role in communication between different levels of courts. Drawing on traditional principal–agent theories, legal doctrine is conceived as the
form in which the Supreme Court as principal gives direction to its
agents.169 Due to legitimacy concerns, the Court is constrained in how it
communicates its preferences. It cannot simply instruct the lower courts to
pursue certain policy outcomes but must instead direct its agents through
written opinions that cite precedent and reason from accepted legal premises.170 On this view, the law is the means by which the Supreme Court tells
lower court judges how they should decide cases.
Scholars utilizing principal–agent theories have generally taken one of
two approaches to the question of how doctrine influences lower court
judges. Some assume that the law merely operates as a signal. The law
does not bind lower court judges in any meaningful way. Rather, they pay
attention to Supreme Court doctrine because it informs them of what types
of outcomes are likely to provoke a sanction—reversal—and how they can
safely avoid negative scrutiny. For example, McNollgast assumes that
judicial doctrine “consists of a statement about the range of lower court decisions acceptable to the Court.”171 To the extent that a lower court is observed to follow upper court precedent, it is “not because it considers the
higher court decision authoritative (and hence creating an obligation) or
persuasive but because of the threat of reversal and a worse outcome from
its own perspective.”172 Apart from its signaling function, the law has no
independent influence on judicial decisionmaking.

168

See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 262 (2006)
(“[R]eflecting an almost pathological skepticism that law matters, positive scholars of courts and judicial
behavior simply fail to take law and legal institutions seriously.”); see also Howard Gillman, What’s
Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of Judicial Decision Making,
26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465 (2001) (describing criticisms of positive political theorists, or “judicial behavioralists,” for failing to take legal variables into account).
169
See, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita & Stephenson, supra note 5, at 757; Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1,
at 328; McNollgast, supra note 3, at 1641.
170
See Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1, at 331 (“Writing doctrines that specify particular policy outcomes in place of reasoned and consistent application of neutral rules and principles would ultimately
weaken the legitimacy of judicial power.”).
171
McNollgast, supra note 3, at 1641.
172
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent
in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1611 (1995) (describing lower courts’ motivation in
agency models).

570

105:535 (2011)

Beyond Principal–Agent Theories

Others assume that legal doctrine has some operative force—that is,
lower court judges feel obligated to obey Supreme Court doctrine and will
do so, even when they do not agree with it.173 This approach is agnostic
about the reasons these judges follow doctrine. It may be because they have
been socialized to respect superior court precedent, because doctrine provides a useful decision heuristic, or for some other reason. Whatever the
explanation, it assumes that “lower court judges display legal obedience,”174
such that the Court can use “the language of its decisions and the structure
of doctrine to limit options of lower courts.”175 And because they feel
bound by doctrine, the law can be used as an “instrument of political control by higher courts over lower courts and the case outcomes they produce.”176
Despite their differing accounts of the effect of doctrine on lower court
judges, both of these approaches share the assumption that lower court
judges will pursue their own policy preferences to the extent feasible, given
the constraints imposed by either the reversal threat or the normative force
of legal doctrine. Just like the economic agent who shirks whenever the
principal is not watching, lower court judges are depicted as strategic actors
who will pursue their own goals to the extent that they can and who therefore seek to evade scrutiny of their actions.177 Even when the law is assumed to have some normative force, agency theory suggests that lower
courts view it as a stricture to be evaded whenever their preferences differ
from those of the Supreme Court.
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING LAW AND THE JUDICIAL HIERARCHY
I have argued above that despite their widespread acceptance, principal–agent theories do not accurately capture the structure of the relationships
within the judiciary. While these models have been useful in advancing
understanding of Supreme Court–lower court interactions, they are not necessarily the best or only way of analyzing hierarchical relationships. In the
absence of the usual contractual tools for shaping the relationship, the Supreme Court’s agency problem begins to look much like the problem confronting any strategic actor when interacting with other parties whose
actions can affect outcomes and thus its ultimate payoff. Moreover, there
are costs to relying on these theories because models necessarily focus attention on certain features while eliding others. Using a principal–agent
173

See, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita & Stephenson, supra note 5, at 757; George & Yoon, supra note 1,
at 824; Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1, at 327.
174
Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1, at 330.
175
George & Yoon, supra note 1, at 823–24.
176
Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1, at 326.
177
Cf. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN
JUDGING 119 (2010) (criticizing the strategic model of judging as “paint[ing] an implausible picture of
judges as magnificent Machiavellian calculators pursuing political agendas with hardly any legal integrity”).
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lens has obscured important normative questions and distorted significant
descriptive features of the federal judicial hierarchy.
Discarding the language of principal–agent theory expands the possibilities for describing the interactions between upper and lower courts.
Agency theories tend to caricature the strategies of both the Supreme Court
and the lower federal courts. In these accounts, the Supreme Court is singularly focused on controlling the decisional output of the lower courts to ensure that lower court decisions comport with its preferences, while the
lower courts are principally concerned with evasion in order to achieve their
own policy goals. Law and doctrine are merely tools in this struggle—ways
of signaling or commanding obedience on the one hand and of feigning
compliance and avoiding detection on the other. What is entirely missing
from this account is any sense that courts at the various levels of the hierarchy might be engaged in a common venture—one in which cooperation
offers the possibility of a joint payoff.
Taking into account this possibility requires a shift in the basic assumption that animates much of the judicial politics literature—namely,
that judges are primarily motivated by their policy preferences. Instead,
one might view judges as engaged in an interaction that involves both elements of cooperation and conflict in a type of mixed-motive coordination
game.178 From this perspective, judges share a common goal—the production of a (relatively) coherent body of rules that can govern primary behavior in the real world and is viewed as authoritative. At the same time, their
efforts at cooperation are plagued by conflicts over what substantive rules
or policies should be instantiated in the law. They struggle over what legal
policies to pursue, but if taken too far, this conflict will undermine coordination to the point that the coherence of the system unravels, leaving all
worse off.
Notice that this approach reverses the usual understanding among judicial politics scholars of the relationship between law and politics. Under
the agency model, judges are assumed to pursue their policy preferences,
and they use the law as a means for doing so. Law expresses their preexisting policy preferences and is an instrument for exercising control over policy outcomes. By contrast, in this alternative framework the production of
law itself, not policy outcomes, is the primary goal. Law is the joint prod-

178

As an alternative to the agency model of adjudication, Lewis Kornhauser has proposed a “team
model,” which he argues explains the institutional structure of the United States courts—that is, a system with trials and appellate courts arranged hierarchically, strict vertical precedent, and horizontal
precedent binding only at the appellate level. See Kornhauser, supra note 172, at 1628. While his proposed model usefully highlights the cooperative aspects of judicial decisionmaking, it does so by assuming that judges at all levels seek to maximize the number of correct decisions and that they share a
common understanding of what the “correct” answers are. See id. at 1612–13. Unfortunately, the model’s failure to take into account value conflicts within the judiciary limits its usefulness in understanding
and predicting judicial behavior.
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uct of judicial efforts at all levels of the hierarchy, but it is also inevitably
the ground for contestation over policy choices.
Law in this sense refers not to a specific case outcome, or even a particular doctrine, but to a body of rules that together govern social interactions. In order to be efficacious, this body of rules must have certain
characteristics. For example, it must be reasonably coherent and sufficiently determinate to allow predictions as to its application but also flexible
enough to adapt to changing social conditions. I do not attempt to enumerate or justify the necessary characteristics here. What is important is that
judicially created law must have certain attributes in order to play its functional role in regulating social interactions and to be viewed as legitimate.
And courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy must coordinate their
actions in order to develop a body of rules displaying these attributes.
Thus, written opinions are better understood not as window-dressing masking policy decisions, or even as signals commanding obedience, but as crucial tools in coordinating the judicial function of rule creation and
development.
In their study of the Supreme Court’s certiorari decisions, Charles Cameron, Jeffrey Segal, and Donald Songer acknowledge that their approach
focused on the Court’s “enforc[ement] [of its] doctrinal preferences . . . throughout the judicial hierarchy but ignore[d] . . . the evolutionary creation of doctrine.”179 Emphasizing the latter—“the incremental,
fact-soaked creation of new rules”180—suggests that controlling lower court
outcomes is less important than finding appropriate cases for identifying
areas in need of development and for articulating rules to address them.
Not only must the Supreme Court rely on the lower courts to provide these
vehicles for law development, but it also must procure their cooperation in
applying its precedents to create a coherent body of rules. Because of its
limited capacity and the infinite variety of factual situations that may arise
in the future, the Court necessarily creates incomplete doctrines. These imprecise rules are subsequently elucidated by the lower courts through their
application to a broad variety of concrete situations. Thus, the meaning of a
particular doctrine cannot be fixed in advance by the Supreme Court but
will necessarily evolve through the process of implementation by lower
courts.
This depiction of law is in many ways like descriptions of the development of the common law but with a focus on interactions between courts
within a hierarchy rather than over time. Intractable value conflicts are ultimately resolved by reference to hierarchical authority, but such resolutions
can never be completely final. Thus, if the Supreme Court disagrees with a
doctrine established in a circuit court, it can overturn that doctrine and arti-

179
180

Cameron, Segal & Songer, supra note 1, at 113–14.
Id. at 102.
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culate its own rule. That rule, however, will in turn be subject to interpretation by the lower courts in subsequent cases.
In struggling over policy, different levels of the judiciary could try to
erode the power of the other. For example, the Supreme Court might impose increasingly rigid rules in an effort to limit the discretion of lower
court judges, while lower courts might attempt to undermine Supreme
Court authority by increasingly distinguishing and limiting its precedent.
Taken to an extreme, coordination between the courts could break down,
destroying the coherence of legal doctrine and the legitimacy of the system
as a whole.181 Thus, although each level of the judiciary has incentives to
pursue its own interests, a complete failure of coordination risks an outcome in which all are left worse off. On the other hand, cooperation, even
though it necessarily entails some suppression of individual policy preferences, may enhance overall coherence and legitimacy, thereby working to
the mutual benefit of both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts.
Viewing the Supreme Court and lower courts as players jointly engaged in the production of law, whose interactions are characterized by both
cooperation and conflict, leads to a different view of the function of information. As discussed above, principal–agent theories suggest that informational asymmetries allow agents to avoid scrutiny of their activities and
thereby afford them greater discretion. Agents therefore seek to exploit
their informational advantage, while the principal will employ mechanisms
to force information sharing. If upper and lower court interactions are characterized by both cooperation and conflict, however, then the role of information becomes more complicated. Lower courts may sometimes value
transparency in their decisionmaking. For example, publishing detailed
written opinions aids upper courts by providing information about developing areas of law or new factual contexts. At the same time, only by making
their activities visible can lower court judges hope to influence policymaking in these evolving areas of law. Even when disagreeing with an upper
court, a lower court may choose to visibly contest an established doctrine—
for example, by arguing that a related factual situation should be distinguished—in an attempt to shape policy by limiting its reach, rather than to
“shirk” in the traditional sense by avoiding scrutiny. The Supreme Court,
on the other hand, may deliberately tolerate or encourage informational
asymmetries—for example, by reviewing certain lower court decisions de181

If the Supreme Court’s only lever of control is its reversal power, then it is theoretically possible
that lower courts could “riot”—that is, engage in widespread disobedience of a Supreme Court
precedent, knowing that the Court would not have the capacity to review all those decisions. Such a
reaction would be possible if enough lower courts disagreed strongly enough with a Supreme Court decision and refused to enforce it. In practice, rioting is unlikely because the preferences of lower courts
are unlikely to diverge significantly enough from those of the Supreme Court and because lower courts
may not be able to coordinate their actions effectively. Nevertheless, massive disobedience by lower
courts is theoretically possible. The impact of such actions on the judiciary as a whole could be quite
significant, destroying coherence and undermining institutional legitimacy.
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ferentially182—in order to focus resources on law development rather than
on controlling outcomes in particular cases.
Elevating the role of law in this way does not entail formalist conceptions of law as a determinate body of rules or a “brooding omnipresence”
waiting to be discovered through legal reason. Nor does it endorse the
more recent claim that judges merely act as umpires calling balls and
strikes. To the contrary, this view of the judicial hierarchy argues that
judges are very much engaged in the project of making law. But it argues
that in doing so they are engaged in a cooperative venture. No single court
has the capacity or the expertise to develop a useful body of rules alone.
All have an interest in cooperating in order to enhance the quality of their
output and their collective legitimacy. At the same time, articulating legal
rules entails choices, and those choices often implicate policy concerns.
The existence of varying policy preferences within the judiciary means that
value conflicts are unavoidable, and the law is also a ground of contestation
over policy. Though inevitable, these policy conflicts are cabined to some
extent by the need for cooperation.
CONCLUSION
The concept of agency has proven useful for analyzing a variety of relationships in law, economics, and politics. When applied to the federal
judicial hierarchy, however, principal–agent theories fit poorly the characteristics of the judiciary in a number of ways. Although those theories usefully highlight the possibility of value conflicts between the Supreme Court
and lower courts, framing the relationship between them as one of agency
has tended to obscure important normative questions about whose interests
the lower courts should pursue and to paint a distorted picture of the role of
law in judicial decisionmaking. Given these limitations, alternative models
may prove more fruitful in understanding the judicial hierarchy.
The discussion above sketches out an alternative approach to conceptualizing the interactions within the judicial hierarchy and the role that law
plays while avoiding the language and assumptions of agency theory. This
effort is preliminary, and more work remains to be done. Nevertheless, the
effort of developing new theoretical frameworks is important to advance
understanding of relationships across the judicial hierarchy. Crucial to this
effort is the recognition that the Supreme Court and lower court judges are
engaged in an ongoing interaction involving elements of both cooperation
and conflict. And rather than seeing the law as a mere tool in their struggle,
it might be more productive to view the production of law as the joint goal
of upper and lower courts as well as the grounds on which their value conflicts play out.
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See, e.g., supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
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